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to speak of condonation until the cause of action has accrued, as before that a return merely terminates the act. *Luper v. Luper*, 61 Ore. 418, 96 Pac. 1099; *La Flamme v. La Flamme*, 210 Mass. 156, 96 N. E. 62. Thus courts have refused to join two periods of desertion. *Burk v. Burk*, 21 W. Va. 445; *Ogilvie v. Ogilvie*, 37 Ore. 171, 61 Pac. 627. But this overlooks the fact that any absence with intent to desert constitutes a marital offense. Moreover, even if termination is the preferable nomenclature in such cases, the termination should be conditional and a breach of the condition should revive the former desertion. In ordinary marital offenses condonation is conditional on future good conduct, and breach of condition revives the former offense. *Sharp v. Sharp*, 116 Ill. 509; *Johnson v. Johnson*, 4 Paige, 460, 470. To reach a just result with the law as it is generally stated many exceptions have been made. See *Lindsay v. Lindsay*, 226 Ill. 309, 80 N. E. 876. It seems preferable to have a plain rule that the termination may be conditional rather than to multiply exceptions to the rule that only the complete offense can be condoned.

INFANTS — CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES — RIGHT TO AVOID CONTRACT WITHOUT RETURNING CONSIDERATION. — An infant purchased goods, not necessities, from an adult and paid part of the purchase price. Having disposed of the goods, he sues to recover the cash paid. *Held*, that the infant recover. *Carpenter v. McGuckian*, 110 Atl. 402 (R. I.).

Upon disaffirming a contract an infant must give up any of the consideration that he has in specie, for the rescission of the contract destroys his right to that property. *MacGreal v. Taylor*, 167 U. S. 688; *Gannon v. Manning*, 42 App. D. C. 206. When under a fair contract he has received benefits which cannot be returned, some cases deny him a recovery of the consideration given. *Johnson v. Northwestern etc. Insurance Co.*, 56 Minn. 365, 57 N. W. 934, 59 N. W. 992; *Rice v. Butler*, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275. But the weight of authority, especially in modern cases, is that the infant may disaffirm and recover back the consideration given though he cannot return the consideration received. *Gonackey v. General etc. Corporation*, 6 Ga. App. 381, 65 S. E. 53; *Blake v. Harding*, 180 Pac. (Utah) 172; *Bombardier v. Goodrich*, 110 Atl. (Vt.) 11. This principle was correctly applied in this case. It follows necessarily from the policy of the law in protecting infants, where the infant has wasted or squandered the consideration. But where he has exchanged it for other property which he now holds, the other party should be allowed to follow his consideration into this other property. *MacGreal v. Taylor*, *supra*. The infant must not be allowed to use his shield as a sword. At the same time it must be remembered that a man may injure himself by running against a shield.

INSURANCE — DEFENSES OF INSURER — SUICIDE OF INSURED. — By the policy in the first case the insurer was not liable if the insured committed suicide within two years after date of issue. The second policy was incontestable after one year. More than two years after issuance of the first and more than one year after issuance of the second policy, the insured committed suicide. *Held*, that the companies are liable on both policies. *Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson*, U. S. Sup. Ct., No. 70, October Term, 1920. *National Life Insurance Co. v. Miller, Adm.*, U. S. Sup. Ct., No. 71, October Term, 1920.

There has been a marked conflict of authority regarding suicide as a defense to policies not expressly excluding its risk during their duration. See 9 HARV. L. REV. 360. The *Ritter* case marked highwater in authority permitting the defense of suicide. *Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.*, 169 U. S. 139. At the same time, an incontestable clause in the policy commonly precluded the defense of suicide. *Supreme Court of Honor v. Updegraff*, 68 Kan. 474, 75 Pac. 477; *Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lovejoy*, 201 Ala. 337, 78 So. 299. A like